Showing posts with label The Caramel-Belching Pinata. Show all posts
Showing posts with label The Caramel-Belching Pinata. Show all posts

Wednesday, September 07, 2011

Say Hello to my Little Friend

So I don’t know if I’m getting old or what, but I totally forgot to get in a preseason Blogpoll ballot until it was too late.  Subconsciously, I suspect that I didn’t want to get a ballot in because the exercise pulls me all over the place.  Do I make picks based on where I think the teams will finish?  Do I rank based on where I think the teams are in August?  If it’s the former, then I am rewarding teams for playing weak schedules and doing my little part to create self-fulfilling prophecies.  If it’s the latter, then how the hell do I know?

Anyway, some thoughts on the ballot:

  • OK, it was only against a I-AA team, but assuming that William & Mary is an above-average I-AA team because they are one of the traditional powers in the CAA (they are, aren’t they?  Jon Stewart, help me out!), then I am feeling good about my optimism regarding Virginia.  This is what a box score should look like when a good team plays a minnow.  UVA had a 300-yard advantage and almost doubled William & Mary in yards per play.  By the way, this paragraph is not exactly a ringing endorsement for the sport of college football.  I am trying to divine meaning in the fact that one team beat a hapless minnow from a lower division worse than other teams did.
  • I took the position last week that Texas A&M is going to end up overrated, but based on the evidence so far, they look good.  Holding SMU to 14 points is no joke.  If you would have told me in the summer of 2008 that Rich Rodriguez would be a total failure at Michigan and fired after three years while Mike Sherman would have Texas A&M rolling by year four, then I might have keeled over right there.  Of course, you then could have revived me by saying that Rick Neuheisel will be on his way out at UCLA by 2011.  Some things can be predicted, after all.
  • Speaking of cardiac events, I wasn’t quite sure what to make of a Michigan defense that made adjustments to what the opponent was doing and got better as the game went on.
  • Yeah, Braxton Miller scares me.  Chris Spielman is not known for being an excessive hyper and he was saying by the fourth quarter that Miller is going to be potentially better than Terrelle Pryor.  An interesting question for Buckeye fans: is it possible that the offense will be better under Luke Fickell because Fickell doesn’t pretend to know that side of the ball and is therefore more likely to give autonomy to offensive coaches?  I guess this theory dies when one realizes that the authority is being given to Jim Bollman.
  • So let me get this straight.  The fourth-best coach in college football took his team to a quasi-neutral site to play the worst coach in college football.  The worst coach, a guy who delegates a lot to his coordinators, came into the game with his offensive coordinator just having been diagnosed with Parkinson’s.  His starting quarterback was suspended for his active participation in a bar fight.  So what happens?  LSU 40 Oregon 27.  It’s just amazing that LSU keeps winning games against quality opponents despite the fact that they have a coach who is worse than Ron Zook, worse than the Queen of England, and worse than Mike Locksley. 

Thursday, September 01, 2011

Your Schwartz Is As Big As Mine: SEC Scoring Versus the National Average

As I was embarking on my remarkable timesuck this weekend of putting 31 years worth of SEC standings into an Excel spreadsheet so I could calculate scoring averages, it occurred to me that I cannot discuss the question of SEC offensive performance over the years without comparing the conference against the national average.  I may have dropped Stats 402 at Michigan within a week because my small section was badly overcrowded, the TA barely spoke English, and “holy s***, this is math!,” but I have enough sense to know that any statistical study requires a baseline.  If we are looking at the changes wrought by Steve Spurrier and Urban Meyer, then we need to know whether the SEC was simply moving along with the rest of college football or if one or both coaches had a significant when they joined the league.

So, thanks to some rudimentary skills with Excel (although not enough skill to convert this to a colorful graph) and a great nap from my two-year old that gave me the time to do this flight of fancy, here is SEC scoring versus the national average from 1980 to the present:  

Year SEC PPG National PPG Margin
2010 30.88 27.78 3.1
2009 28.2 26.87 1.33
2008 25.22 26.92 -1.7
2007 30.06 28.23 1.83
2006 25.2 24.18 1.02
2005 23.83 26.54 -2.71
2004 24.69 26.4 -1.71
2003 27.15 26.66 .49
2002 25.43 27.13 -1.7
2001 27.56 26.78 .78
2000 26.35 25.99 .36
1999 24.68 25.69 -1.01
1998 25.51 25.69 -.18
1997 25.58 25.58 0
1996 24.38 25.52 -1.14
1995 26.67 25.3 1.37
1994 26.17 24.52 1.65
1993 24.33 24.51 -.18
1992 21.63 23 -1.37
1991 24.26 23.02 1.24
1990 23.15 24.72 -1.57
1989 23.07 24.21 -1.14
1988 22.06 23.98 -1.92
1987 24.74 23.24 1.5
1986 23.18 22.86 .32
1985 22.72 22.4 .32
1984 23.98 22.17 1.81
1983 21.91 22.25 -.34
1982 23.43 21.77 2.66
1981 19.63 20.52 -.89
1980 21.94 20.66 1.28

Some thoughts on the numbers:

  • There is no doubt that Urban Meyer and the Spread has had a major impact.  After his first year, SEC scoring has exceeded the national average in four of five years, each time by at least a point.  2010 was the most offensive year in the 31-year sample by some margin.  Ironically enough, Meyer’s offense was dreck last year, but the slack was picked up by Malzahn’s Auburn, Petrino’s Arkansas, Spurrier’s South Carolina, Mullen’s Mississippi State, and Saban’s Alabama.  If one viewed 2006-10 in isolation, then one could reach the conclusion that offenses in the SEC took a quantum leap and therefore the conference got better, but…

 

  • The link between offensive success and conference success is broken when one looks at the 80s.  In four of ten seasons, scoring in the SEC was below the national average.  In those years, the SEC was the best conference nationally (as measured by SRS) twice and finished second in the other two years.  Look at 1983.  According to SRS, this was the best year for the conference in the entire sample.  Auburn finished 11-1 and should have won the national title.  Georgia’s only loss was to Auburn and the Dawgs then beat unbeaten, #2 Texas in the Cotton Bowl.  (“What’s the time in Texas?  Ten to nine.”)  Florida, Tennessee, and Alabama were all excellent.  There wasn’t a single SEC team that finished with an SRS number below zero.  The SEC was wildly successful in 1983 despite the fact that its teams scored below the national average.

 

  • A related note: Pat Dye won four SEC titles at Auburn.  In three of those four years, the league finished below the national average in scoring.  There’s no question as to what environment was favorable for Dye’s Tigers.

 

  • In terms of Spurrier’s impact, the effect took a little while.  Scoring generally went up, with a major blip in 1992.  A major part of that blip was Alabama’s epic ‘92 defense, not to mention the fact that Georgia had by far its best defense of the decade, allowing only 12.9 points per game.  Spurrier’s team had its worst offensive performance of the 90s in 1992, scoring only 24.2 point per game.  Scoring then picked up thereafter, reaching an apex in 1994 and 1995, the height of the Spurrier offensive boom.  By 1996-99, the effect was over.  Also, it’s worth noting that the SEC’s second-best performance in terms of collective SRS rating took place in 1997, when the conference matched the national scoring average exactly.  Again, offensive prowess is not necessary for the league to succeed.

 

  • What the hell happened in 2006?  Generally speaking, the national scoring average has shown a stead, gradual ascent, adding a touchdown over the course of 31 years.  2006 looks like a massive, isolated recession.  Scoring dipped by over two points from the prior season and then shot up by over four points in 2007.  2007 was a wacky year in sorts of ways, one of which is that it featured the highest scoring average in modern college football history. 

 

  • 2008 stands out as a transition year for the SEC.  It was the last year in which the Meyer offense was truly great, as Dan Mullen took his talents to Starkville after the season.  On the other hand, it was the offensive nadir for Tommy Tuberville, it featured an Alabama team that had not yet figured out how to move the ball effectively, it was the training wheels year for Petrino at Arkansas, and it was the end of the line for Phil Fulmer at Tennessee, and Sylvester Croom at Mississippi State.  Think of 2008 as the SEC’s awkward teenage year. 

 

  • If I put words in HP’s mouth that the offensive dark ages for the SEC was the first half of the Aughts, then the numbers belie his conclusion.  SEC scoring out-paced the national average in 2000, 2001, and 2003 before collapsing in 2004 and 2005. 

 

  • If I had to sum up my views on the changes wrought by Spurrier and Meyer, I would say that both pulled the SEC in the direction that college football was headed generally.  As college football moved from I-formation running to passing out of multiple receiver sets in the 90s, the SEC followed suit with Spurrier at the vanguard.  As college football has progressed to be dominated by the Spread in the second half of the Aughts, the SEC has again tracked the trend with Meyer’s offense as the shining example.  Stepping into the realm of speculation, the SEC is especially well-suited to take advantage of the Spread because of the number of athletes in the South who can both run and throw, thus filling the critical role in the Spread?  (Where did Oregon find Darron Thomas?  Where did Michigan find Denard Robinson?)  Did I just give myself another research project?

 

  • Man, I am getting desperate to have some actual games to discuss.

Monday, August 29, 2011

Spurrier Versus Urban: Who Had the Bigger Impact?

My pissing matches with Heisman Pundit are usually just for fun.  My tiny niche on the Internet is the Statler & Waldorf role, usually by criticizing other writers and media types.  I like arguing, so this is an easy role to fill.  It also generates chances for cheap, lazy posts, so it is consistent with my half-assed approach to this endeavor.  However, my latest exchange with the college football blogosphere’s favorite PR guy actually led me to an interesting question: did Steve Spurrier have a bigger offensive impact on the SEC than Urban Meyer? This point seemed self-evident to me:

The funny thing is that HP could actually tell the story he’s trying to spin if he set 1990 as his starting point instead of 2005.  When Steve Spurrier came to the conference, it was in the throes of basic I-formation football.  The 80s were dominated by Vince Dooley early and Pat Dye late, with Johnny Majors having some success sprinkled in the middle.  Running and defense was the dominant style.  Spurrier’s passing attack took the conference completely by storm and his teams proceeded to finish first in the conference for six of the next seven years.  Spurrier’s success led the rest of the league to innovate, with such examples as the Hal Mumme/Mike Leach Air Raid offense at Kentucky, Auburn going spread-ish with Dameyune Craig, and Tennessee modernizing its offense with David Cutcliffe.  Spurrier had a massive impact on the SEC and opponents either imitated or died.  Thus, the conference that Urban Meyer joined 15 years after Spurrier’s arrival was anything but the backwater that HP imagines.

HP rebutted in the comments section:

1. If Spurrier started an offensive revolution in the SEC, it sure didn't show up much in the offensive data for other teams…

7. Your claim that Spurrier changed offenses more than Meyer did in the league is absurd. The proof is in the offensive numbers, the titles and the Heisman winners. For instance, the Heisman is only won with superb offensive numbers. That's a truism. So, it's no shock that the only SEC Heisman winner between 1986 and 2007 came from Florida, the only SEC school that had outstanding offensive production. Of course, since 2007, there have been three SEC Heismans, which coincides with the league's offensive explosion (as I demonstrated by the numbers in my post). Do you think it's all just a cosmic coincidence?

8. I grant you that Spurrier did introduce the forward pass to the SEC. But those offenses that started passing were nowhere near as innovative as Spurrier's and they did not keep up with some of the other leagues and that is reflected in the national offensive numbers during that time (as I pointed out, only 1 SEC team averaged over 35 ppg from 1998 to 2005, and 10 have since...another coincidence?)

The crazy thing about sports arguments is that there are usually numbers to help resolve arguments.  With the help of the ESPN SEC Football Encyclopedia* and the invaluable college football section at Sports-Reference.com, as well as heavy usage of Microsoft Excel, I created a chart to measure a number of factors over the past 31 years of SEC football:

  • Points per game scored by SEC teams collectively;
  • SEC teams finishing in the top ten nationally in scoring offense and total offense;
  • Consensus offensive All-Americans from the SEC;
  • SEC offensive players who finished in the top ten of the Heisman voting; and
  • The SEC’s SRS Rating and conference rank based on SRS.

I included the last two categories because I wanted to compare the overall strength of the conference with its offensive numbers.  Normally, I wouldn’t care about individual awards in assessing overall conference strength, but HP suggested them as a yardstick and they do have some value in assessing the subjective opinions of the media regarding SEC’ offenses.  I would have liked to have included yardage figures on the chart, but I couldn’t find those figures for the 80s and since the point of this exercise is to test whether the 80s were more of an offensive dark age than the first half of the Aughts, I couldn’t use yardage as a measuring stick.  If someone knows where I could find those figures, I’d be all ears.  

* – I bought the Encyclopedia on my last trip to Borders because “everything must go!”  Yup, my last purchase at one of my favorite stores was shaped by one of my online Newmans.

To steal a line from Brian Cook, chart?  Chart.     

Year PPG Top 10 Total Offense Top 10 Scoring Offense Offensive All-Americans Offensive Heisman Top Ten SRS SRS Rank
2010 30.88 2 1 2 2 8.20 2
2009 28.2 1 2 3 2 10.35 1
2008 25.22 0 1 3 1 6.83 2
2007 30.06 0 1 3 2 9.78 1
2006 25.2 0 1 1 1 9.02 1
2005 23.83 0 0 2 0 4.61 5
2004 24.69 0 0 2 1 4.85 5
2003 27.15 0 0 1 1 7.10 1
2002 25.43 0 0 1 0 6.32 2
2001 27.56 1 1 5 1 8.57 1
2000 26.35 0 1 0 1 5.32 4
1999 24.68 0 0 3 1 7.71 2
1998 25.51 1 1 3 2 5.52 4
1997 25.58 2 1 3 2 10.68 1
1996 24.38 1 1 3 2 6.04 2
1995 26.67 2 4 0 2 5.86 3
1994 26.17 2 1 1 2 6.98 2
1993 24.33 2 2 1 3 6.13 4
1992 21.63 1 1 2 1 4.96 3
1991 24.26 2 0 0 1 5.74 2
1990 23.15 1 1 2 0 1.89 6
1989 23.07 0 0 2 1 7.17 1
1988 22.06 0 0 1 0 4.52 2
1987 24.74 1 1 2 2 8.47 1
1986 23.18 1 1 2 1 6.26 2
1985 22.72 0 0 3 1 9.24 1
1984 23.98 0 0 2 0 8.91 1
1983 21.91 1 1 1 1 11.22 1
1982 23.43 0 1 1 1 9.09 2
1981 19.63 1 1 1 1 7.49 2
1980 21.94 0 0 1 1 9.80 1

There are two major points to be made here.  First, look at the difference between the SEC before and after Spurrier as compared to the SEC before and after Meyer:

Before and After Spurrier

Year PPG Top 10 Total Offense Top 10 Scoring Offense Offensive All-Americans Offensive Heisman Top Ten SRS SRS Rank
1980-89 22.66 4 5 16 9 8.21 1.4
1990-2001 25.02 15 14 23 18 6.28 2.83

Even accounting for the fact that we are comparing a ten-year period against a 12-year period, there can be no argument that Spurrier wrought a massive change to the SEC.  Look at 1995.  That year, there were four SEC teams in the top ten nationally in scoring offense, or one fewer than the SEC produced in the entirety of the 80s.  So much for the claim that only Florida was moving the ball in the 90s.  Tennessee, Georgia, Auburn, South Carolina, and Kentucky all appeared in the top ten in scoring or total offense during the decade, with Tennessee, Kentucky, and Georgia all appearing multiple times.  Also in 1995, SEC teams averaged a touchdown more than they did in 1991 and a half a touchdown more than they did in the last season before Spurrier.  That is some fast, significant change.

If you want the kicker, look at the SRS numbers.  Despite the fact that the SEC was a defense-heavy conference in the 80s, the league was better in that decade relative to the rest of college football.  According to SRS, the SEC was the best conference in the country six times in those ten years and second in the other four years.  During Spurrier’s 12 years, the league finished outside of the top two six times.  The conclusion here is simple: offensive success does not correlate to overall strength.

There is also a conclusion to be drawn that success in the form of national titles isn’t necessarily evidence of a strong conference (although I certainly take that position a lot when the topic of the Big Ten comes up).  The SEC was extremely strong in the 80s, but the decade did not produce a national champion for the conference after Georgia’s title in 1980.  There were certainly close calls, specifically for Georgia in 1982, Auburn in 1983,* and possibly Tennessee in 1985, but no SEC team even played in a bowl game billed as a national title game after 1982.  Maybe the conclusion to be drawn is that a defense-heavy super-conference is less likely to produce a national champion than a more balanced one.     

* – I’ve said it before and I’ll say it again: the fact that Miami was a unanimous national title in 1983 is indefensible.  Auburn finished with the same record and played the toughest schedule in the nation.  According to SRS, the Tigers played five of the top ten teams in the country.  Miami didn't play a single team in that category until they had the good fortune to play Nebraska on their home field in the Orange Bowl.  In short, the voters overrated Nebraska in 1983 (dominated a schedule that turned out to be fairly soft) and then overreacted to Miami upsetting Nebraska.  And to think that we might have been spared the entire era of Da U if voters were more rational.   

Take Auburn as an example.  In 1988, the Tigers had an epic defense and missed out on a shot to play Notre Dame for the national title in the Sugar Bowl because of the Earthquake Game, which Auburn lost 7-6.  Fast forward to 2010 and Auburn went unbeaten and won the national title despite playing in more close games than the ‘88 team.  The team with a great defense and average offense lost a game did not play for the title; the team with the great offense and the average defense did.  Is this a lesson that a defense-oriented conference is less likely to produce national champions?

Before and After Meyer  

Year PPG Top 10 Total Offense Top 10 Scoring Offense Offensive All-Americans Offensive Heisman Top Ten SRS SRS Rank
1999-2004 25.98 2 2 12 5 6.65 2.5
2005-10 27.23 3 6 14 8 8.13 2.0

Yes, there is a difference, but it is not as pronounced as the difference pre- and post-Spurrier.  Scoring has gone up, but not as much as the Spurrier era versus the 80s.  SEC offensive players have been more likely to receive individual accolades, but how much of that is because the offenses are better and how much is because the teams are outstanding?  (Counterpoint: SEC teams were excellent in the 80s, but they didn’t have a raft of award-winners, so simply winning isn’t enough.) 

That said, the last four years have seen an offensive explosion.  In two of the past four years, the SEC’s scoring average exceeded 30 points per game.  There is a strong parallel to be made to the Spurrier era.  Offensive change does not occur overnight.  It takes time for other programs around the conference to look at what the Gators are doing and ramp up what they are doing offensively.  In the Spurrier era, it took five years.  By 1994-95, SEC teams were scoring 3-4 points more per game than they had in the 80s.  In the Meyer era, it took only three years for the conference’s offenses to see similar progress, followed by a major regression in 2008 (apparently, Meyer’s influence isn’t complete) and then a progression back to 30 ppg in 2010. 

Coming later this week, an answer to a follow-up question: did the changes in scoring in the SEC after Spurrier and Meyer track offensive changes in college football overall?  In other words, did scoring go up simply because of a rising tide of points in college football generally?

Tuesday, August 02, 2011

SEC Football Started in 2006? Who Knew?

Heisman Pundit, allow me to introduce you to Stephen Orr Spurrier.  For ease of reference, here is his Wikipedia page.  You may remember him from such awards as the 1966 Heisman Trophy, the 1988 and 1989 ACC Coach of the Year, and the 1990, 1991, 1994, 1995, 1996, 2005, and 2010 SEC Coach of the Year.  I suggest that you familiarize yourself with Mr. Spurrier’s body of work because you attempt to tell the recent offensive history of the SEC without reference to Spurrier.  This is a little like telling the story of the Civil War without mentioning Abraham Lincoln.

Heisman Pundit’s thesis is that everything changed for the SEC when Urban Meyer came into the league because Meyer brought the spread offense with him.  With a keen ability to confuse correlation and causation, HP then claims that the league’s five straight national titles is the direct result of the spread’s arrival.  This argument is wrong for a variety of reasons:

  1. Urban Meyer won his first national title in 2006 with a stumbly-wumbly version of the spread that never scored more than 28 points in any SEC game.  Florida was out-gained on a per-play basis by LSU, coordinated by Jimbo Fisher whom HP thinks is a dolt, and equalled on a per-play basis by an Arkansas offense that HP dismissed at the time as a high school offense.  (Funny how things have changed now for Gus Malzahn, the offensive coordinator of that team who feuded with the rest of the staff, and David Lee, who came up with the Wildcat concept for that team.)  Meyer’s first national title came not as a result of his offensive scheme, but rather because of other strengths as a coach, such as making good staffing decisions on the defense, as well as the good fortune of following a head coach who was a very good recruiter. 
  2. Les Miles won the national title in 2007 with a gumbo of offensive concepts, coordinated by a guy whom HP and I would agree is no savant.
  3. Nick Saban won the national title in 2009 with a pro-style offense that HP tries to shoehorn into his world of sophisticated offenses by confusing formations with schemes, thus rendering the distinction between offenses meaningless.  (If use of the Pistol and Wildcat is evidence of a spread offense, then so would use of a shotgun, four-wide formation.)
  4. HP tried to dismiss the SEC has having won only two national titles in the seven years before Meyer’s arrival.  However, the seven-year period in question also saw Auburn go unbeaten and not get a shot at the title (I assume that HP thinks that Al Borges runs a sophisticated offense, as evidenced by the fact that he listed Brady Hoke as one of the ten best coaches in college football and Hoke relies on Borges for his offenses) and Georgia go 13-1 and meet the same fate.  Both Auburn and Georgia were simply unlucky in that they had great seasons in years in which two major powers went unbeaten.  The seven-year period also includes the 2001 Florida team that was one of the best teams of the decade, but managed to lose two games because of a weak defensive coordinator (I thought that SEC teams only lost in this period because of backwards offenses?) and Ernest Graham getting hurt twice.

The funny thing is that HP could actually tell the story he’s trying to spin if he set 1990 as his starting point instead of 2005.  When Steve Spurrier came to the conference, it was in the throes of basic I-formation football.  The 80s were dominated by Vince Dooley early and Pat Dye late, with Johnny Majors having some success sprinkled in the middle.  Running and defense was the dominant style.  Spurrier’s passing attack took the conference completely by storm and his teams proceeded to finish first in the conference for six of the next seven years.  Spurrier’s success led the rest of the league to innovate, with such examples as the Hal Mumme/Mike Leach Air Raid offense at Kentucky, Auburn going spread-ish with Dameyune Craig, and Tennessee modernizing its offense with David Cutcliffe.  Spurrier had a massive impact on the SEC and opponents either imitated or died.  Thus, the conference that Urban Meyer joined 15 years after Spurrier’s arrival was anything but the backwater that HP imagines.

Two other unrelated notes:

1. HP thinks that Florida is insane to turn its offense over to Charlie Weis, but he also holds Bobby Petrino in high regard.  Schematically speaking, how much difference is there between the Petrino and Weis offenses?  When answering this question, consider Mike Lombardi’s statement that Petrino’s offense is the closest simulation to modern NFL offenses.

2. In the realm of statements that reflect that HP doesn’t understand his own purported specialty, check out this gem:

If John Brantley couldn’t complete throws in a passing scheme as simple as Urban Meyer’s spread, I’m not sure how he’s suddenly going to do so in the far-more-complicated Charlie Weis system.

The Meyer/Rodriguez/Kelly variant of the spread has simple passing concepts because of the running threat that it poses.  Specifically, the offense is so good at running the ball based on its ability to use the quarterback as a runner and therefore outnumber the defense in the box that it causes opposing safeties to freak out.  Thus, receivers are open and quarterbacks have easy throws to make.  This is how Alex Smith because the top pick in the draft.  The offense didn’t work with Brantley because Brantley can’t run and therefore, receivers weren’t as open as they were for Tim Tebow.  (The comic stylings of Steve Addazio were also a factor in the Florida offensive Gotterdammerung.) Weis’s offense does not rely on the quarterback as a running threat in order to pressure a defense, so it ought to be a better fit for Brantley.  If producing NFL busts by making quarterbacks look much better than they are is the measure of a good college offensive mind, then Weis is right up there with Jeff Tedford.*

* – This argument would have worked better before Aaron Rodgers.

Thursday, June 23, 2011

Heisman Pundit is Mean to Kindly Old Grandmas

OK, I have no evidence to support that accusation,* but that title is no more misleading than an alleged list of the ten worst coaches in college football that instead focuses solely on whether a coach deploys the right offensive scheme and makes good end-of-game decisions, as if those are the only roles for a college head coach. It's hard to pick a starting point for savaging a list that is to college football analysis what Sarah Palin's ramblings are to American history (Blutarsky is off to a great start, although I'm highly disappointed that he discussed the Muschamp section without ripping on the assertion that a John Brantley-led offense has "incredible spread talent"), but I'll pick the fact that Heisman Pundit assumes that blue chip players simply fall off of trees. If a coach recruits great talent and only produces good results, then that coach is not an idiot. Instead, he's a guy who succeeds in one area of his job (recruiting) and is not succeeding in another (motivating players, assembling a good staff, and/or making strategic and tactical decisions).

* - Just to be clear, I am in no way alleging that Heisman Pundit (or whatever other nom de guerre he is using today) is a bad person or otherwise acts in an illegal or immoral matter. Rather, I am making an analogy to illustrate that a post titled "The Ten Worst Coaches in College Football" is totally misleading when it reduces coaching to one or two aspects that HP finds important.

Take Les Miles, the alleged worst coach in college football. I'm not Miles's biggest fan. He was very fortunate to win a national title with two losses. He stuck with Gary Crowton for way too long. He destroyed his reputation as a late-game savant with inept game management against Ole Miss in '09 and Tennessee in '10. Like Lloyd Carr, his teams play far too many close games against inferior opponents. (How is it that two Bo disciples have the same weakness of respecting the opposition too much? This was certainly not a problem for Mssr. Schembechler.) That said, the notion that he's a bad coach is absurd. Records aren't everything, but look at these results and tell me that you see evidence of the worst coach in college football:

2005 - 11-2, Sagarin Predictor #8
2006 - 11-2, Sagarin Predictor #5
2007 - 12-2, Sagarin Predictor #4
2008 - 8-5, Sagarin Predictor #22
2009 - 9-4, Sagarin Predictor #13
2010 - 11-2, Sagarin Predictor #10

And I'm just using the Predictor because I'm intellectually honest (try it sometime, HP) and I favor rankings that account for margin of victory. If I used Sagain's BCS-approved rankings, then his teams would look even better.

We're well past the time when Miles's success could be attributed to Nick Saban. Larry Coker he's not. (Coker in year six: 7-6, #49. There was no year seven.) Honestly, you have to be an utter idiot to look at those numbers and conclude "worst coach in college football!" At a minimum, you ought to have a better argument than "a potted plant" could win at LSU. Perhaps Heisman Pundit never heard the names Gerry Dinardo or Curley Hallman? That seems odd for someone who is now branding himself as "College Football Pundit." If this list is an example of what we are going to see this season when HP branches out from Heisman patter, then I no longer have to rue the fact that Terence Moore left the AJC.

After the lame insults directed to Miles, the piece doesn't get better. #5 on the list is Jimbo Fisher, who has been a head coach for all of one year and in that year, led FSU to its best season in years. HP complains about Fisher's offense, but the 2010 Noles offense - the first one for which Fisher had total autonomy - finished second in the ACC in yards per play. If you prefer advanced metrics, they were eighth in the country in both S&P and FEI. Oh, the indignity! And HP implies that Fisher only accomplished this because of Christian Ponder, but who turned Ponder - a three-star recruit whom Rivals ranked as the #14 pro-style quarterback and the #50 prospect in Texas - into a first round pick?

HP sums up the fallacy of his mindset when he asks "Fisher can recruit, but can he coach?," as if recruiting isn't part of being a head coach. The funny thing is that there is an obvious, recent, high-profile example refuting HP's worldview and yet he rolls merrily along. Rich Rodriguez is HP's dream coach. Rodriguez is one of the originator's of the Spread offense that caused HP to forsake all others. By year three at Michigan, Rodriguez had the offense humming, producing prodigious numbers with a young set of players. However, Rodriguez was also a total failure at Michigan because he screwed up all of the other aspects of being a head coach. He didn't recruit especially well, player retention, motivation, and development were issues, and most importantly, he utterly butchered the defense with a mismatched set of an inept defensive coordinator and substandard position coaches who only knew a system different than the one favored by the coordinator.* By HP's definition, Rodriguez was a great coach. He had a terrific offensive scheme and he made reasonable end-of-game decisions. By the definition of Michigan fans and just about any other sentient being, the Michigan version of Rodriguez was a disaster.

* - I don't think that these flaws are endemic for Rodriguez. He did perfectly well in the other head coaching functions at West Virginia. Rather, Rodriguez is a good coach who made a number of big mistakes at Michigan. If he has learned his lesson (and I'll bet that he's a smart enough guy to do so), then he'll do well when he's the head coach at Clemson next year. The ACC might finally have an elite worth discussing if Clemson and FSU join Virginia Tech as annual contenders. Plus, I still like the guy.

Friday, October 16, 2009

We're #1...in an Arbitrary, Meaningless Way!!!

In the aftermath of President Obama winning the Nobel Peace Prize, Jonathan Chait has penned an entertaining attack on awards. Happily, there is college football content:

Some years later, Gino Toretta of the University of Miami won the 1992 Heisman Trophy, which goes to the best college football player. Toretta was approximately the third-best player—at his position, within his state. He was probably one of the worst starters on his own team. Toretta went on to be selected in the next-to-last round of the NFL draft, where — without suffering any major injuries — he completed a total of five passes in his career.


There is also a passage that hits a little close to home:

Yet awards provide emotional responses — gratification, victimization, schadenfreude — that makes the ritual perversely compelling. Understanding that the process is fatally flawed, or even corrupt, seems to do nothing to diminish its appeal. Those most convinced that, say, the Oscars do a horrible job of rating films are the very people who cling to their emotional investment in the outcome.


How is it that I have complete disdain for the Heisman Trophy and yet I frequently find myself arguing about the injustice that no Tennessee or Alabama players have ever won it? If the award is a meaningless statue given to an unjustifiably small subset of college football players and is governed by a set of irrational and indefensible rules, then why do I care?

And this observation was especially interesting to me:

Our mania for awards stems from a desire to sift through a chaotic world and impose linearity and a singular winner.


Can't we say the same thing about our desire to label one team as a "champion" at the end of a season? After all, what is the national title but another award? Dozens of college football teams play dozens of games for four months and then at the end, because we have to impose order on a disordered world, we declare that one team is the "champion" and then spend decades arguing about whether the right team won. American pro sports are worse, as they all involve a long regular season followed by a short playoff, at the end of which there is an arbitrary "champion" that is often demonstrably inferior to other teams in the league.

Why do we feel the need to have a defined champion at the end of a season? Is it because we feel the need to impose the structure of an individual game upon a season, such that there must be a winner? Is it because we want sports to mimic society and society is governed by laws? Is it a nefarious plot on the part of apparel companies, who would have a hard time selling "Georgia: Really Good Season in 2007" shirts? Is it, as Chait suggests, an attempt to impose order in a world where chaos reigns?

Friday, August 28, 2009

It's Too Bad That SEC Offenses Aren't Fancy Like the One That Featured Ron Dayne

If you want to see a great instance of shifting rationales, check out HeismanPundit's latest effort at defending the useless award about which he bases his existence. HP's initial argument was that SEC teams haven't thrown the ball enough over the past 30 years to win a Heisman Trophy. After a critical review from the Senator, the rationale has now shifted:

The point isn’t so much that the offenses need to be cutting edge, but if you are going to produce Heismans in a quarterback-dominated era, you’d better have guys who can throw the ball and put up numbers. And if you have a great running back, he’d better get a lot of yards. The SEC hasn’t been doing enough of that in the last 20 years and that’s why its Heisman production has not kept up with its prominence in the team rankings.


In case you're wondering why that rationale shifted, it's because HP is trying to glide past the Senator's citation of Ron Dayne, who played in an offense that was anything but sophisticated. So now, the argument is that you need an offense that puts up a lot of numbers, either at the quarterback position or at running back. Really? Heisman winners need gaudy statistics? That's a revolutionary concept.

And why do SEC players not put up gaudy numbers? I'll give you two reasons, none of which will have anything to do with Cro Magnon offenses in the Deep South:

1. SEC defenses do not permit opponents to run up huge numbers. Ask Sam Bradford.

2. SEC teams are more likely to rotate running backs. This is because there is more talent in the South and most top teams have multiple running threats. In this respect, SEC teams are more advanced than their counterparts in other conferences, as the majority of offensive coaches in the NFL have figured out that rotating backs makes sense. (The coach of the local pro football collective could stand to learn this lesson.) The fact that Heisman voters fall for ruses like Javon Ringer putting up numbers because he gets the ball 30+ times every game against average defenses is an indictment of the award, not of SEC offenses.

I'll also make the point that the characterization of SEC offenses as being less likely to throw the ball is simply wrong. Off the top of my head, SEC offenses of the past 20 years have included: David Cutcliffe's offenses at Tennessee and Ole Miss, Terry Bowden's offense at Auburn (especially when he had Dameyune Craig), Nick Saban and Jimbo Fisher's offense at LSU when they rode Rohan Davey and Josh Reed to an SEC title, the Air Raid offense at Kentucky, the offense that Rich Brooks built around Andre Woodson at Kentucky, the 1994 Georgia team with Eric Zeier, the adaptation of the Fast Break that Mark Richt has employed at Georgia, and Steve Spurrier's offenses at South Carolina and Florida. Yeah, other than that, no one throws the ball in the SEC.

And then HP turns his loving attention to my post. Initially, notice the unsubtle attempt to bait and switch. My argument is this: it cannot be a coincidence that the two SEC teams in the all-time top ten in winning percentage - Alabama and Tennessee - have combined to win zero Heismans while the other eight programs have combined to win 35. Knowing that he has absolutely no chance when discussing Tennessee, a program whose two best candidates lost to the only Heisman winner from a losing team and the only Heisman winner who played defense, he just ignores them and instead focuses on Alabama. He makes a decent point when noting that Alabama did not produce a lot of runners with gaudy stats in the 1970s because the wishbone tended to disperse carries. (This would be an instance of an SEC offense being too advanced for simple-minded Heisman voters.) HP then challenges me to come up with an Alabama player who should have won the award. Since Don Hutson left Alabama just before the first Heisman was awarded, I'll vote for Shaun Alexander.

In 1999, Alexander ran for 1,383 yards and 19 touchdowns, while also catching 25 passes for 323 yards and four touchdowns. He played on an Alabama team that won the SEC while playing one of the hardest schedules in the country and became the first SEC team to win in the Swamp, a game in which Alexander was unstoppable. The award was instead won by Ron Dayne, who ran for 1,834 yards and 19 touchdowns, while catching exactly one ball for nine yards. Dayne did not break 100 yards against Michigan (Wisconsin's albatross at the time), he did not play Penn State, and Wisconsin played their typically ludicrous non-conference schedule.

So let's see: Alexander totaled 1,706 yards and 23 touchdowns against a very difficult schedule and had a huge performance in Alabama's biggest game of the year, while Dayne totaled 1,843 yards and 19 touchdowns against a relatively easy schedule. If you apply the rationale that was used to defeat Peyton Manning's Heisman campaign - Florida was Tennessee's bete noire and his poor performance at the Swamp killed his chances - then Dayne had no business winning the award after gaining 88 yards on 22 carries against Michigan (including a big fat goose egg on eight carries in the second half) and his team lost 21-16 with Wisconsin's last touchdown coming against a prevent defense in the final minutes. Alexander then went well before Dayne in the NFL Draft and had a far better pro career, a fact that I mention only because any reasonable person could have looked at the two of them at the time the Heisman vote was conducted and predicted that result. Alexander was a great runner and Dayne was a fat tub of goo who was great at running through giant holes at top speed like a giant boulder, but lousy against defenses that could force him to change direction. If Heisman voters couldn't figure out that Dayne was a product of his system and that Alexander was a far better player, then the award isn't worth much. Which it isn't.

HP, please mention the idea that Dayne won the award as a career achievement reward. Please please please.

Thursday, August 27, 2009

Bear Bryant: Neanderthal

I was in the mood to write about a gross generalization this morning, so G-d bless HeismanPundit for providing me with one. To pile onto the Senator's criticism, this post confirms that HeismanPundit doesn't know his ass from a hole in the ground when it comes to football history. HP claims that other conferences were "opening it up and putting up fancy passing numbers, the SEC (until recently) was content to run off tackle and play defense." If that's true, then HP is apparently talking about the 1980s and onward, which omits the first four decades and changes of the Heisman's existence. I doubt that Notre Dame was "opening it up and putting up fancy passing numbers" when Paul Hornung beat Johnny Majors for the award. I'd love to see HP defend the notion that Woody Hayes was doing so when Archie Griffin won two Heismans.

I'd also be intrigued to hear HP's argument that Bear Bryant's offenses at Alabama were unsophisticated for their times. In the 60s, Bryant produced Joe Namath and Ken Stabler. One might surmise that his offenses at that time were a little more than "run[ning] off tackle and play[ing] defense." In the 70s, Alabama went 103-16-1running the wishbone, which was certainly not a vanilla offense in its day. As a USC fan, maybe HP should research what happened when Bryant unveiled Bama's version of the offense in the Coliseum. Naw, that would involve actual use of research and facts as opposed to pulling a sweeping generalization from his rear end.

Here is the list of the ten winningest programs in college football history, along with the number of Heismans that each program has claimed. See if you can spot a trend:

1. Michigan - 3
2. Notre Dame - 7
3. Texas - 2
4. Oklahoma - 5
5. Ohio State - 7
6. USC - 7
7. Alabama - 0
8. Nebraska - 3
9. Tennessee - 0
10. Penn State - 1

Hmmm, what do the two programs on that list that have never won a Heisman have in common. I can't imagine. I guess Alabama and Tennessee should have thrown the ball around like Nebraska and they too would have three Heisman winners.

Finally, the argument that the Heismans won by Florida, Florida State, and Miami players proves that there is not a bias against players from the Deep South is just wrong because Florida isn't culturally part of the Deep South (or at least large portions of Florida aren't). I don't know if Mike Lupica has a Heisman ballot, but to take him as an example, if you played word association with him and said the word "Florida," he'd probably think of relatives who have retired to Boca Raton. If you said "Alabama" or "Tennessee," the result would be a little different.

Tuesday, July 21, 2009

Look Who's Pleased with Himself Again

First we had a return of Duel with the Jews, now we have the return of my beloved pinata belching caramels:

Check out this story by ESPN’s Mark Schlabach on the evolution of the spread offense.

It reminds me a lot of what I wrote waaaay back in 2005:

This is why I’ve thought for a while now that the introduction of the Urban Meyer spread option to Florida will have a profound effect on the SEC and hence college football. The spread option has, until now, not been run by a team with a lot of talent. Like BYU’s system, it was very effective at a Mountain West Conference school. Now, it will be run with all the talent at Florida’s disposal, which makes one wonder if it will eventually have the same effect that Norm Chow’s offense had at USC…

What’s more interesting is how the SEC will respond if the Meyer system turns out to be a hit. The SEC has the best athletes in college football. As good as the elite teams in the SEC are now with those athletes, how good would they be with multi-faceted, multi-pronged offenses showcasing that talent?


The article upon which HeismanPundit claims victory is this piece from Mark Schlabach on the rise of the spread offense. Aside from driving me crazy by lumping a number of disparate offenses into the category of "spread," Schlabach's discussion of the historical roots of the spread is quite interesting. He gives a lot of credit to Mouse Davis, one of the inventors of the run 'n' shoot. One of the defining characteristics of Davis's offense was that he did not use a tight end, as he alludes to in the article:

"When we started running it, people would say, 'You just can't run it because it's so unsound,'" Davis said. "They'd all say, 'You have to have a tight end.'"


It makes sense that an offense that eschews the tight end would be a forefather to the modern spread. After all, the one characteristic that the Mike Leach offense has in common with the Rich Rodriguez offense is that they both deploy a number of receivers across the formation to force the defense to stretch its defense from boundary to boundary. If an offense has the tight end close to the formation, then it is limiting the degree to which it can spread the defense out. Tight ends, by definition, compress an offense.

(Note: there are exceptions to this maxim. For instance, Missouri runs a variant of the spread and they use their tight ends heavily. Michigan will probably use its tight ends heavily this year because Rodriguez inherited Kevin Koger from his predecessor. I would want to go back to watch Missouri tape to confirm this point, but I would submit that the spread doesn't really use a tight end. Rather, it lines up big guys at the slot receiver position and calls them tight ends. Thus, it's consistent with Mouse Davis's idea, even if a number of passes end up being thrown to the "tight end.")

So, college football has been taken over by an offense that does not use the tight end and was developed by a coach who was adamantly opposed to ever using the position. I'm pretty sure that there was a blogger who claimed that one of the defining characteristics of advanced modern offenses was their heavy use of the tight end:

6. You must throw to your tight ends or running backs with regularity and from your base formation.

That means that you don’t completely betray your intentions by bringing in packages for certain situations, much the way that Oklahoma would bring in Kejuan Jones as a third-down back, for example. About 95% of the time, his presence meant a pass. This was a very important point in the Orange Bowl and worthy of a brief digression:

The guy on defense whose primary responsibility is to cover the tight end is the strong safety. The defender whose primary responsibility is to cover running backs out of the backfield is the outside linebacker, usually the weakside backer. That’s Football 101. When I looked at the matchups before the Orange Bowl, I realized that Oklahoma doesn’t throw to its tight end very much and doesn’t throw to Adrian Peterson out of the backfield (AD had all of four catches in ‘04, I believe). Logically, I posited that that flaw in Oklahoma’s scheme would have the effect of freeing up USC’s strong safety and outside linebackers to cheat up and play the run, thus effectively neutralizing Adrian Peterson. That meant that all USC had to do from there was get a pass rush with its front four and force White to make plays. As it turns out, USC’s strong safety (Darnell Bing) made a season-high 10 tackles, while the weakside backer (Matt Grootegoed) not only had 7 tackles, but also was able to float around in coverage against receivers and grab an interception. To wit, it would not have been possible for these two players to have been this successful in this game had they been burdened with the usual responsibilities of their positions.

The fact that most SEC offenses–save Auburn–do not throw to their tight ends or backs creatively or with regularity out of their base formations lends us to believe that teams like Georgia would be at a distinct disadvantage against a team like Boise State. The point is granted by many that Boise may be able to move the ball at least somewhat on Georgia. What many then point out is that Boise will not be able to stop Georgia, since Boise is not known for its defense. But, we believe that the disadvantage to UGA from seeing the system thrown at them by Boise’s offense will be greater than the disadvantage thrown at the Boise defense by UGA’s rather vanilla offense. In other words, Boise’s defense won’t be seeing anything it hasn’t seen, while Georgia will be seeing things for the first time. This should enable Boise to control the tempo of the game, especially early on. The only remaining question is this: Is UGA’s talent advantage so overwhelming that Boise can’t overcome it with its scheme? Given Boise’s performances against teams like Oregon State and Louisville–teams with pretty good talent–and Georgia’s trouble with teams like Ga. Southern and Marshall–teams with less talent than Boise–I would answer that question in the negative. Throw in an erratic D.J. Shockley in his first start and Georgia may be playing things even more conservative than usual, which of course will play right into Boise’s hands.


Only HeismanPundit could claim victory by linking to an article that, in fact, refutes his basic idea as to what made an excellent scheme.

Tuesday, August 07, 2007

Just When I Think I'm Out...

HeismanPundit writes something so inane that it pulls me back in. I don't know how I missed this gem last week, but HP has now decided that a Plus-One game is a bad idea because he's a "stodgy traditionalist" who doesn't want college football to be more like the NFL (as opposed to: (1) a Pac Ten supporter who will likely back up anything that comes out of Tom Hansen's mouth; and (2) one of the few allegedly sentient beings on earth who doesn't realize that Auburn going 12-0 in 2004 and not getting a shot at the national title was a little problematic). No sooner has HP taken on the mantle of Harley Bowers and voiced his support for tradition than he comes up with a ham-handed scheme to standardize just about everything relating to conference size and scheduling in college football. Right, because one of the traditions of college football is clearly that every conference should have the same number of teams and that the NCAA should be able to mandate what conferences look like. I can't think of any other league that is quite so standardized.

This is going to be an exercise in demonstrating to a child that Darth Vader isn't really hiding in his closet, but I'll do it anyway. Why is this plan a bad idea?

1. College football would generate significantly less revenue under this "plan" because teams with large fan bases would be forced to play road games against teams with small fan bases. It makes no economic sense for Tennessee to play a road game at Middle Tennessee State when Tennessee's stadium holds more than three times as many people. This plan only makes sense if you support the Pac Ten, which has relatively small fan bases as compared to the Big Ten and SEC and therefore their teams have to play name opponents in their non-conference games in order to sell tickets.

And more importantly, the TV networks would gag at the thought of the MAC, WAC, and Sun Belt champions getting automatic BCS berths and thus getting mandatory prime time exposure. On occasion, one of these programs will produce a team worth seeing (such as Boise State last year or Miami (Ohio) when they had Ben Roethlisberger) and expanding the BCS by one game has taken care of that problem. I was originally opposed to the BCS adding on an extra game (except to the extent that it was a precursor for a Plus One format), but last year's Fiesta Bowl changed my mind. That said, the prospect of Houston and Troy in a BCS game would make most programming directors run for the nearest open window and would therefore reduce the negotiating position of the major conferences. Additionally, removing conference title games would be a third way in which the plan would be a revenue-negative, as those games have been cash cows for the conferences and the TV networks.

2. If every conference has to be the same size and every conference has to play a round-robin, then you have one of two likely possibilities. If the standard size is ten, then the SEC, Big Ten, and Big XII would have to evict teams that would then have nowhere to go because all the other major conferences are full. In the end, you would have some bizarre amalgamation of castaways from various geographic spots forming a new conference. That sounds like a result that a "stodgy traditionalist" would support.

Conversely, if the standard size is 12 (and this really makes the most sense) and a round-robin schedule is mandated, then each team is going to play one non-conference game. Teams would have all sorts of problems synchronizing their conference schedules with their non-conference schedules in terms of home and road games. More importantly, the opportunities to compare conferences against one another would be severely reduced, which defeats the whole point of this half-baked plan, which was to standardize the world so better comparisons can be made.

3. This statement is a unique blend of myopia and lack of understanding of history:

But, all this talk of the BCS and how someone is getting screwed every year...that gets tiresome. I remember the old bowl system. Nothing was really solved at the end of the season. The polls voted on the teams and it was great. No one bitched or moaned--we were too busy enjoying the Rose Parade to care.


You're right. No one ever bitched about the old bowl system. Alabama fans didn't bitch when their two-time defending national champions went 11-0 in 1966 and finished behind a Notre Dame team that tied in East Lansing. Notre Dame fans didn't bitch when their team lost close votes in 1989 and again in 1993. USC fans didn't bitch when their team had to share the national title in 1978 with an Alabama team that the Trojans beat in Birmingham during the season. Penn State fans didn't bitch when their team went unbeaten in 1969 and was ignored in the national title discussion. Something tells me that fans in Tuscaloosa and State College weren't saying to themselves "we're too busy enjoying the Rose Parade."